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A B S T R A C T
Speed-accuracy trade-oﬀs are often considered a confound in speeded choice tasks, but individual
diﬀerences in strategy have been linked to personality and brain structure. We ask whether
strategic adjustments in response caution are reliable, and whether they correlate across tasks
and with impulsivity traits. In Study 1, participants performed Eriksen ﬂanker and Stroop tasks in
two sessions four weeks apart. We manipulated response caution by emphasising speed or ac-
curacy. We ﬁt the diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks and correlated the change in boundary
(accuracy – speed) across session and task. We observed moderate test-retest reliability, and
medium to large correlations across tasks. We replicated this between-task correlation in Study 2
using ﬂanker and perceptual decision tasks. We found no consistent correlations with im-
pulsivity. Though moderate reliability poses a challenge for researchers interested in stable traits,
consistent correlation between tasks indicates there are meaningful individual diﬀerences in the
speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ.
1. Introduction
Response control is one of the cornerstones of cognitive psychology, and a topic of interest for both experimental and correlational
approaches. Individual diﬀerences in tasks such as the Stroop (Stroop, 1935) and Eriksen ﬂanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), have
been linked to executive functioning (Miyake et al., 2000), impulsive behaviour (Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014), and a variety of
neuropsychological conditions (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Gauggel, Rieger, & Feghoﬀ, 2004; Lansbergen, Kenemans, &
van Engeland, 2007; Moeller et al., 2002; Verdejo-Garcia, Perales, & Perez-Garcia, 2007). From an experimental perspective, re-
sponse control paradigms feature prominently in modelling and neurophysiological studies, where the goal is to characterise the
general mechanisms responsible for the control of action (Bompas, Hedge, & Sumner, 2017; Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, & Palmeri,
2015; Munoz & Everling, 2004). Though the application of these tasks across diﬀerent disciplines is promising for the development of
a coherent understanding of response control, recent work has illustrated that there are challenges to interpreting individual dif-
ferences because they can arise from diﬀerent sources, including strategic processes (Boy & Sumner, 2014; Hedge, Powell, Bompas,
Vivian-Griﬃths, & Sumner, 2018; Miller & Ulrich, 2013). Here, we ask whether strategic processes, often considered to be a confound
in cognitive studies, represent a reliable and general component of decision making.
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1.1. Multiple processes underlying individual diﬀerences in response control
In conﬂict tasks, such as the Stroop, ﬂanker or Simon tasks, we typically subtract reaction times or errors in a baseline condition
(congruent or neutral) from a condition in which the stimulus provides conﬂicting information (incongruent). When used in an
individual diﬀerences context, the resultant RT or error costs are treated as an index of the individual’s ability to resolve competition
between conﬂicting response options (e.g. Friedman & Miyake, 2004). However, the processes underlying behaviour are multi-
faceted, and variability in the magnitude of an RT cost or error cost cannot easily be attributed to a single mechanism (Hedge, Powell,
Bompas, et al., 2018; Miller & Ulrich, 2013). For example, it has long been theorised that an individual’s reaction time reﬂects not
only their ability to process a stimulus, but also their strategic choice to favour speed or accuracy (Pachella, 1974; Wickelgren, 1977).
Indeed, one of the reasons why we use within-subject designs when examining diﬀerences between conditions in average RTs is to
account for this so called speed accuracy trade-oﬀ (SAT). However, individual diﬀerences in strategy still contribute to variability in
the RT costs. Individuals who favour accuracy over speed produce larger RT costs, as well as smaller error costs (Hedge, Powell,
Bompas, et al., 2018; Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Wickelgren, 1977).
In order to dissociate contributions of strategy and ability in a cognitive task, we require a framework that characterises the
contributions of both to behaviour. One such framework is that of sequential sampling models (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; McKoon &
Ratcliﬀ, 2013; Ratcliﬀ & McKoon, 2008; Ulrich, Schroter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, 2015). These models assume that choice RT
behaviour can be captured by a process of accumulating evidence sampled from the environment, until a boundary or threshold is
reached. The rate at which evidence is accumulated represents the eﬃciency of processing, and the height of the boundary reﬂects
the amount of evidence that an individual waits for before deciding on the response (i.e. their level of response caution, or strategy).
By dissociating these processes, and for their ability to simultaneously account for both the RT and accuracy of responses, sequential
sampling models could provide a useful window into individual diﬀerences in response control (see e.g. Hedge, Powell, Bompas,
et al., 2018; White, Curl, & Sloane, 2016).
1.2. Response caution as a meaningful component of response control
To many researchers conducting choice RT tasks, strategic processes are considered a confound to the mechanisms of interest. For
example, composite measures of RT and accuracy have been proposed with the explicit intention of providing a better control for
SATs than traditional subtractions in studies of (e.g.) executive functioning (Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016; Liesefeld & Janczyk,
2018). However, there is evidence that strategic control itself may be a meaningful measure of individual diﬀerences, as captured by
sequential sampling models. For example, more cautious response strategies are often observed in healthy older adults, relative to
younger adults (e.g. Ratcliﬀ, Thapar, & McKoon, 2006; Thapar, Ratcliﬀ, & McKoon, 2003). Studies have also observed changes in
response caution in individuals with autistic spectrum disorders, though the studies vary in the direction of the eﬀect (Karalunas
et al., 2018; Pirrone, Dickinson, Gomez, Staﬀord, & Milne, 2017; Powell et al., 2019). Finally, in multiple response control task
datasets, we observed a correlation between tasks in model parameters representing response caution, in the absence of correlations
in parameters reﬂecting conﬂict processing (Hedge, Powell, Bompas, & Sumner, 2019).
Participants in the aforementioned studies are typically instructed to be both fast and accurate, such that the levels of response
caution observed are interpreted as the individual’s ‘default’ strategy when given no explicit instruction to favour speed or accuracy.
However, individuals are also able to ﬂexibly adjust their strategy if instructed. In SAT paradigms, participants are instructed to
prioritise speed in some blocks and accuracy in others, which is (primarily) captured in sequential sampling models by an individual
decreasing or increasing their boundary (for a review, see Heitz, 2014). The extent to which individuals are able or willing to adjust
their level of caution has also been the subject of individual diﬀerences research. Larger decreases in caution under speed emphasis
relative to accuracy emphasis in a perceptual decision task were correlated with increased BOLD activation in the striatum and pre-
SMA (Forstmann et al., 2008), as well as increased structural connectivity between those regions (Forstmann et al., 2010; though see
Boekel et al., 2015 for a non-replication of the connectivity). An association has also been observed between response caution under
speed emphasis and self-reported “need for closure” (Evans, Rae, Bushmakin, Rubin, & Brown, 2017). Need for closure is a per-
sonality trait theorised to reﬂect an individual’s preference for certainty over ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), from which
Evans et al. predicted that a greater need for closure would lead to more urgent decision making. In line with this prediction, when
the data were ﬁt with the linear ballistic accumulator model (Brown & Heathcote, 2008), individuals with a greater need for closure
set a lower threshold (Evans et al., 2017).
In sum, the research to date suggests that individual diﬀerences in response caution and its strategic adjustments have the
potential to inform our understanding of cognitive functioning in both healthy individuals and neuropsychological conditions.
However, this promise is tempered by several unknowns. First, the psychometric properties of response caution and its strategic
adjustments are not well understood. Test-retest reliability is an important consideration for individual diﬀerences research, re-
ﬂecting the degree to which individuals can be consistently ranked on the dimension of interest (i.e. more or less cautious). Recent
work has suggested that traditional measures of response control have sub-optimal reliability, and these concerns may also extend to
model-based analyses (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Paap & Sawi, 2016). Though a few studies have examined the test-retest
reliability of model parameters representing response caution (Enkavi et al., 2019; Lerche & Voss, 2017; Schubert, Frischkorn,
Hagemann, & Voss, 2016), to our knowledge none have examined the reliability of strategic adjustments of caution in a SAT
paradigm.
A second consideration is the extent to which individual diﬀerences in strategic control adjustments can be generalised from a
single task. Several studies have observed correlations in response caution between tasks when neither speed nor accuracy are
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preferentially reinforced (Hedge et al., 2019; Lerche & Voss, 2017; Ratcliﬀ, Thompson, & McKoon, 2015), though those that have
examined the SAT have used a single perceptual decision task (Evans et al., 2017; Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010).
Here, we address this gap in the literature with two experiments. In the ﬁrst, we apply a model of response control (the diﬀusion
model for conﬂict tasks; Ulrich et al., 2015) to test-retest data from the ﬂanker and Stroop tasks under diﬀerent SAT instructions. This
allows us to examine whether adjustments in control are reliable over time within the same task, and whether they generalise across
tasks within the same cognitive domain. In the second experiment, we examine generalisability more broadly by comparing a
response control task (ﬂanker) to a perceptual decision task (random dot motion) commonly used in the decision making literature.
To examine potential relationships with related constructs, we also collected data on self-reported impulsivity in both studies, as well
as compliance and personality in Study 2.
2. Study 1: Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were 57 (6 male) undergraduate and postgraduate psychology students. Participants took part either for payment or
for course credit. All participants gave their informed written consent prior to participation in accordance with the revised
Declarations of Helsinki (2013), and the experiments were approved by the local Ethics Committee.
2.2. Design and procedure
Participants completed both the Stroop and ﬂanker task in two 90min sessions taking place approximately 4 weeks apart. A
schematic of these tasks, as well as the random dot motion task used in study 2, can be seen in Fig. 1. We administered the UPPS-P, a
self-report measure with subscales for diﬀerent types of impulsivity, (Lynam, Whiteside, Smith, & Cyders, 2006; Whiteside & Lynam,
2001), after participants complete the behavioural tasks. Participants completed the tasks in a dimly lit room from a viewing distance
of approximately 60 cm. Stimuli were presented on a 36.5 cm by 27.5 cm display (60 hz, 1280× 1024).
2.2.1. Eriksen ﬂanker task
Participants responded to the direction of a centrally presented arrow (left or right) using the z and m keys. On each trial, the
centrally presented arrow (1 cm×1 cm) was ﬂanked above and below by two other symbols separated by 0.75 cm, so that ﬂankers
were individually visible. Flanking stimuli were either arrows pointing in the same direction as the central arrow (congruent con-
dition), straight lines (neutral condition), or arrows pointing in the opposite direction to the central arrow (incongruent condition).
Trials were separated by an interval of 750ms.
2.2.2. Stroop task
Participants responded to the colour of a centrally presented word (Arial, font size 70), which could either be red (z key), blue (x
key), green (n key) or yellow (m key). The colours were not purposely matched for luminance. The presented word could be the same
as the font colour (congruent condition), one of four non-colour words (lot, ship, cross, advice; neutral condition), or a colour word
Fig. 1. Schematic of tasks used in Study 1 (ﬂanker and Stroop) and study 2 (ﬂanker and random dot motion). The stimuli for the ﬂanker and Stroop
task are identical to those we have used previously (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). See text for details.
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corresponding to one of the other response options (incongruent). Trials were separated by an interval of 750ms.
For each session and task, participants completed 12 blocks, consisting of 4 each for speed, standard and accuracy instructions.
Each block consisted of 144 trials, with 48 each of congruent, neutral and incongruent stimuli (192 trials total per congruency and
instruction condition). The order of blocks was randomised, as was the order of trials within blocks. At the beginning of speed-
emphasis blocks, participants were instructed “Please try to respond as quickly as possible, without guessing the response”. For
accuracy blocks, participants were told “Please ensure that your responses are accurate, without losing too much speed”. For standard
instruction blocks, participants were instructed “Please try to be both fast and accurate in your responses”. In speed blocks, if
participants responded slower than 500ms in the ﬂanker or 600ms in the Stroop, the message “Too slow” appeared on screen for
500ms. In the accuracy condition, the message “Incorrect” appeared if participants made an error. In all blocks, the message “Too
fast” appeared if participants responded faster than 150ms in the ﬂanker and 200ms in the Stroop task (typically< 1% of trials).
Participants received feedback about both their average RT and accuracy after each block in all instruction conditions.
Stimuli were presented until response. In the Stroop task, stimuli were presented for a maximum duration of 1950ms. Trials
exceeding this were rare (0.3% and 0.2% of trials in session 1 and 2).
2.3. Data processing
Two participants were removed because they did not return for the second session. We excluded participants if there average
accuracy across all instruction blocks fell below 60%. This resulted in more participants being retained for the ﬂanker task (N=47)
than the Stroop (N=43). These participants were retained for the reliability analysis in the ﬂanker task, but were excluded when
calculating correlations across tasks. We removed RTs less than 100ms, and greater than the individual’s median plus three times
their median absolute deviation for each condition (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013). We did not code trials as incorrect on
the basis that they exceeded our deadline for feedback in speed blocks, as changing the relationship between RT and accuracy would
confound our modelling. The data are available on the Open ScienceFramework (https://osf.io/zag7c/).
For the reliability analysis, we calculated Intraclass Correlation Coeﬃcients using the psych package in R (ICC2; Revelle, 2018;
Team & R Development Core Team, 2016). This value is the ratio of between-subject variance in the measure to the total variance,
comprising between-subject variance, between-session variance, and error variance. The form of the ICC corresponds to a two-way
random eﬀects model for absolute agreement (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).
While the ICC is interpreted as a correlation, ranging from zero to one, diﬀerent criteria are used to interpret the degree of
reliability compared to interclass correlation eﬀect sizes (Pearson’s R and Spearman’s rho). ICCs above 0.8 are typically considered
excellent, while 0.6 and 0.4 are categorised as good and moderate reliability (Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch,
1977). In contrast, Pearson’s R values of 0.5, 0.3 and 0.1 are typically interpreted as large, medium and small eﬀect sizes respectively
(Cohen, 1988). The higher convention for the ICC primarily reﬂects the application rather than the calculation, as high levels of
reliability are typically a pre-requisite to correlational work. When calculated on the same data, intra and interclass correlations
usually produce similar values (see supplementary material A for diﬀerent calculations).
2.4. The diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks
The diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks (DMC; Ulrich et al., 2015) is a mathematical model of two-choice reaction time behaviour in
response conﬂict tasks. It assumes that the response options are represented by an upper and lower boundary, here corresponding to
the correct and incorrect response respectively. The decision processes can be described by a process of accumulating evidence from
the stimulus until one or the other boundary is reached (see Fig. 2A). The reaction time on a given trial is determined by the time it
takes for a boundary to be reached, plus the duration of sensory and motor (non-decision) processes. For mathematical details, see
Ulrich et al. (2015).
Boundary separation is the critical parameter for our current goal of measuring individual diﬀerences in response caution.
Individuals who are more averse to making errors and slow their responses to avoid them should have higher boundary separation
values. When participants are instructed to emphasise speed, this is primarily captured by lowering their boundary in that block (for
reviews, see Heitz, 2014; Ratcliﬀ, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016). Recent evidence has indicated that the changes under speed
emphasis are also reﬂected in non-decision time to a degree in non-conﬂict tasks, and sometimes also by a change in drift rate (see
e.g. Rae, Heathcote, Donkin, Averell, & Brown, 2014). However, the sensitivity of DMC parameters to the SAT manipulations have
not been examined. Given the time-consuming nature of the ﬁtting process for our datasets, and the relatively large number of
possible variants, we make the simplifying assumption that only boundary separation varies across SAT instruction conditions here.
The DMC assumes that the accumulation process on a trial is a combination of processing from controlled and automatic pathways
(De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Ridderinkhof, 2002). The controlled route is responsible for processing the task-relevant stimulus
feature (e.g. the central arrow in the ﬂanker task), and is represented by drift rate parameter that is constant across conditions.
Automatic activation is implemented as a re-scaled gamma function, described by two free parameters (amplitude and time-to-peak)
and one ﬁxed parameter (shape). Initially, the automatic activation receives a strong input, reﬂecting the capture of a prepotent
response by (e.g.) the ﬂanking arrows. After it reaches a maximum value (amplitude) at a speciﬁed point in time (time-to-peak), the
automatic activation decreases, reﬂecting decay or active suppression (Hommel, 1994; Ulrich et al., 2015). In addition to the
aforementioned parameters, which are typically the focus of interest, the model has two parameters describing variability in the
starting point of the accumulation processes and variability in the duration of non-decision time respectively.
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2.5. Model ﬁtting
For each participant and task, we estimated nine parameters: boundary separation under speed emphasis, boundary separation
under standard instructions, boundary separation under accuracy emphasis, the amplitude of automatic activation (A for congruent
trials, 0 for neutral trials, -A for incongruent trials), the time to peak automatic activation, mean non-decision time, drift rate of the
controlled process, the shape parameter of the starting point distribution, and variability in non-decision time. Variability in starting
points and non-decision time are captured by a beta and normal distribution respectively. As with Ulrich et al. (2015), the diﬀusion
constant/within-trial noise (σ) was ﬁxed to 4, and between-trial variability in drift rates was ﬁxed to 0. We ﬁxed the shape parameter
of the automatic activation function to 2 for all tasks, following Ulrich et al. (2015).
We accuracy-coded our data, such that the upper and lower response boundaries corresponded to the correct and incorrect
response options. This allowed us to collapse across diﬀerent stimulus conﬁgurations (e.g. a congruent ﬂanker stimulus irrespective of
Fig. 2. Schematic of the diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks (Ulrich et al., 2015). Panel A shows the noisy accumulation of evidence to a boundary on a
single trial. It is assumed that when speed is emphasised, participants set the boundary (grey line) closer to the start of the accumulation processes
than under accuracy emphasis (black horizontal line), corresponding to waiting for less evidence before making a response. A small distance
between the upper and lower boundary leads to faster RTs, but an increased likelihood of hitting the lower boundary, producing an error. This
change in boundary between accuracy and speed emphasis, represented by the arrow, is the strategic adjustment of response caution that is the
focus of this study. Panel B shows the average underlying patterns of activation. The black diagonal line corresponds to the speed of controlled
processing, represented by a drift rate parameter. The blue and red functions represent automatic activation in congruent and incongruent trials
respectively. The function initially receives a strong input until reaching a maximum value (amplitude parameter) at a point deﬁned by the time-to-
peak parameter. Panel C shows the composite drift rates for congruent and incongruent trials. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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whether the arrow was pointing left or right), and also to ﬁt the same model to the four-choice Stroop data (Voss, Nagler, & Lerche,
2013). Though this level of abstraction is not ideal, it relates RT and accuracy to capture the strategic processes that we are interested
in, and there is currently no extension of the model for four choice tasks.
After excluding outlier RTs as described above, correct and incorrect RTs from congruent, neutral and incongruent conditions in
each instruction block were separately binned into quantiles. We ﬁt the DMC to experimental data using the similar approach to that
used by the Diﬀusion Model Analysis Toolbox (DMAT; Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008). Correct RTs were binned using ﬁve
quantiles (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9). Incorrect RTs were binned using ﬁve quantiles if the total number of errors in that condition>10,
otherwise they were not used. The application of ﬁve quantiles produced six bins per RT distribution (corresponding to: 0–10%,
10–30%, 30–50%, 50–70%, 70–90%, 90–100%). Therefore, participants’ ﬁts would be based on either 6 or 12 data points per
instruction and congruency condition, resulting in between 54 and 108 data points in total. These quantiles are commonly used when
ﬁtting sequential sampling models (c.f. Ratcliﬀ & Tuerlinckx, 2002). We calculated the deviance (-2 log-likelihood) between observed
and simulated quantiles, which was minimised with a Nelder-Mead simplex (Nelder & Mead, 1965) implemented in the fminbnd
function in Matlab. We constrained the search such that all free parameters were positive, and the shape of the starting point
distribution was greater than one.
Initially, we ﬁt each participant’s data using 5000 parameter sets that were randomly generated from a uniform distribution (see
supplementary material B for maximum and minimum values). This was done to explore plausible starting points for our ﬁtting
algorithm. We then took the 15 best parameter sets resulting from this initial search, and submitted each of those to the simplex
algorithm, in which we simulated 10,000 trials per condition at each iteration. The simplex was re-initialised 3 times to avoid local
minima. After the process was completed, we took the single best ﬁtting parameter set for each individual. This process took ap-
proximately 6 days per dataset, and was performed on Cardiﬀ University Brain Research Imaging Centre’s (CUBRIC) high perfor-
mance computer cluster.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Descriptive statistics
3.1.1. Behavioural data
Reaction times and error rates for both tasks are shown in Fig. 3. To verify that the average performance reﬂected the expected
manipulations, we conducted separate 3(instruction)× 3(congruency) repeated-measures ANOVAs on RTs and error rates for each
session and task. In all cases we observed signiﬁcant main eﬀects for both congruency and instruction (all p < .001; see
Supplementary Material C for full ANOVA results). Error rates and RTs increased for incongruent relative to congruent stimuli.
Further, error rates increased and RTs decreased when participants were instructed to prioritise speed over accuracy.
3.1.2. Model parameters
Descriptive statistics for the best ﬁtting parameters can be seen in Table 1. Graphical displays of the model ﬁts can be seen in
Supplementary Material D.
The values are numerically similar to previous ﬁts we have observed in a non-SAT context (Hedge et al., 2019), with the Stroop
showing a relatively slower time-to-peak and a higher value for the shape of the starting distribution (corresponding to less variability
in start points). This reﬂects that the manual Stroop task does not tend to show fast errors (see Supplementary Material D). The model
was successful in capturing the relative speed and accuracy of participants, though the data show more fast errors under speed-
emphasis than the model. In both tasks and sessions, boundary separation was decreased under speed relative to neutral and accuracy
emphasis, indicating that the parameter captured the SAT manipulation in the expected way.
3.2. Within-task reliability of strategic adjustments of response caution
We quantiﬁed strategic adjustments in response caution by taking the diﬀerence in boundary separation under speed-emphasis
relative to accuracy emphasis for each individual. Strategic adjustments showed moderate reliability across both tasks (ﬂanker
ICC=0.5, Stroop ICC=0.40; see Fig. 4). To put these model parameter correlations in context of the behaviour from which they’re
derived, we also examined the reliability of adjustments to RT and accuracy rates in isolation (averaged across congruency condi-
tions). This led to a similar range of values, with ICCs from 0.46 to 0.68 (see Supplementary Material A for a full report). In other
words, the reliability of the model parameters were not systematically higher or lower than the behavioural measures. Note that
boundary separation is theorised to reﬂect a balance between RT and accuracy, and so would not have the same interpretation as
either behavioural measure in isolation.
See Table 2 for the reliability of all the DMC parameters. We also draw attention to the 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) given in this
table. While a CI cannot be interpreted as an indicator of the precision of an estimate (c.f. Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, &
Wagenmakers, 2016), under similar assumptions as those used to calculate a p-value, it can be interpreted to contain the values we
cannot reject based on our statistical test (Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, & Wagenmakers, 2016). In other words, just as we reject the null
hypothesis (ICC= 0) based on the interval for adjustments in the ﬂanker task (95% CI: 0.26–0.69), we also reject values that
correspond to excellent or clinically required levels of reliability (ICC > 0.7).
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3.3. Between-task correlation of strategic adjustments of response caution
Our second key question is whether strategic adjustments in response caution correlate between tasks, which we assessed using
Spearman’s rho. We observed moderate to large correlations between tasks in each session (session 1 rho= 0.56, p < .001; session 2
rho=0.40, p= .038; Fig. 5). Again, these were similar to the correlations observed in the adjustments of RTs and accuracy in
isolation, which ranged from 0.31 to 60 (see Supplementary material A).
We present the correlations between strategic adjustments of response caution and UPPS-P subscales in supplementary material E.
Brieﬂy, we see no consistent correlation across our datasets.
Fig. 3. Violin plots showing the distribution of mean reaction times and accuracy for each task and session. Filled circles show the means. All plots
show the expected patterns, with accuracy and RT increasing from speed to accuracy emphasis.
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3.4. Reliability of other model parameters
As we are the ﬁrst to examine the test re-test reliability of the DMC parameters (not just the strategic adjustments to boundary),
we present these in Table 2, along with the between task correlations. The reliability of the three main non-conﬂict parameters (drift
rates, boundary separation in each instruction condition and non-decision time) ranges from moderate to good, and are similar to
those observed for the standard drift-diﬀusion model (Lerche & Voss, 2017). For conﬂict processing parameters, the amplitude of the
automatic activation showed moderate reliability in both tasks, whereas the time-to-peak was relatively poor. The between-task
correlations are generally similar to that which we observed with these tasks in our other work (that did not include a SAT ma-
nipulation; Hedge et al., 2019).
3.5. Interim discussion
We discuss the implications of these values in more detail in the general discussion. First, we follow up on the observation that
strategic adjustments in response caution correlate between the ﬂanker and Stroop tasks in both sessions. This result is promising, and
suggests that we can generalise our interpretation of individual diﬀerences in strategic control beyond a single task. However, it
raises the question of whether it generalises outside of response control tasks, or if strategic adjustments may diﬀer depending on the
broad cognitive domain. This is particularly relevant as previous papers that have examined individual diﬀerences in strategic
adjustments have used a perceptual decision task, rather than conﬂict tasks (Evans et al., 2017; Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010). To
assess whether individual diﬀerences in response caution also generalise across cognitive domains, we conducted a second study in
Table 1
Mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of parameters from the diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks (Ulrich et al., 2015).
Flanker (N=47) Stroop (N=43)
Parameter Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
Response caution
Boundary: Speed 26 (12.4) 25.5 (11.9) 31.4 (13.4) 22.7 (13.9)
Boundary: Standard 46.8 (13.5) 43.5 (15.8) 62.9 (12.8) 56.2 (19.6)
Boundary: Accuracy 64.8 (16.4) 58 (13.7) 71.4 (15) 67.1 (18.1)
Boundary: Accuracy – Speed 38.8 (20.5) 32.5 (18.7) 39.9 (16.4) 44.4 (19.6)
Boundary: Standard – Speed 20.7 (12.1) 18 (16.2) 31.5 (13.4) 33.5 (17.3)
Conﬂict processing
Amplitude 27.9 (9.8) 26.3 (8.6) 20.8 (8.8) 20.2 (9.3)
Time-to-peak 132 (47) 135 (39) 543 (161) 575 (211)
Non-conﬂict parameters
Drift rate 0.73 (0.19) 0.73 (0.18) 0.29 (0.07) 0.31 (0.09)
Non-decision time 316 (23) 310 (24) 385 (34) 385 (35)
Start shape 2.2 (0.9) 2.3 (0.9) 8.3 (4) 8.7 (5.4)
Non-decision variability 50 (10) 48 (10) 80 (21) 84 (21)
Fig. 4. Test re-test reliability for strategic adjustments of control in the Flanker task (N=47; panel A) and Stroop task (N=43; panel B). Strategic
adjustments in response caution are deﬁned as the change in boundary separation in the diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks under speed emphasis
relative to accuracy emphasis. The measurement units are the absolute diﬀerences in the upper boundary parameter values.
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which participants performed the ﬂanker task along with a random dot motion discrimination task under a SAT manipulation.
4. Study 2: Method
4.1. Participants
Participants were 81 (6 male) undergraduate and postgraduate psychology students. Participants took part either for payment or
for course credit. Six participants that participated in Study 1 also participated in Study 2. The studies took place a year apart. All
participants gave their informed written consent prior to participation in accordance with the revised Declarations of Helsinki (2013),
and the experiments were approved by the local Ethics Committee.
4.2. Design and procedure
Participants completed both the ﬂanker task and a dot motion discrimination task based on (Pote et al., 2016). The participants
also completed a number of questionnaires for the purpose of exploratory analyses: the UPPS-P impulsivity scale, the NEO-FFI
personality inventory (McCrae & Costa, 2004), the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (Gudjonsson, 1989), and a Situational Compliance
Table 2
Test re-test reliability of model parameters in the ﬂanker task (N=47) and Stroop task (N=43), and between task correlations (N=43). 95%
conﬁdence intervals are shown in parentheses.
Parameter Reliability (ICC) Between task (rho)
Flanker Stroop Session 1 Session 2
Response caution
Boundary: Speed 0.53 (0.29–0.71) 0.41 (0.09–0.65) 0.53 (0.23–0.72) 0.64 (0.36–0.82)
Boundary: Standard 0.71 (0.53–0.83) 0.39 (0.12–0.61) 0.57 (0.31–0.75) 0.63 (0.39–0.79)
Boundary: Accuracy 0.49 (0.22–0.69) 0.5 (0.24–0.69) 0.4 (0.13–0.62) 0.33 (0.01–0.59)
Boundary: Accuracy – Speed 0.5 (0.26–0.69) 0.4 (0.12–0.62) 0.56 (0.31–0.73) 0.4 (0.05–0.67)
Boundary: Neutral – Speed 0.43 (0.17–0.63) 0.44 (0.16–0.65) 0.62 (0.41–0.76) 0.44 (0.14–0.65)
Conﬂict processing
Amplitude 0.55 (0.32–0.72) 0.47 (0.2–0.67) 0.2 (−0.1–0.46) 0 (−0.29–0.29)
Time-to-peak −0.04 (−0.33–0.25) 0.19 (−0.12–0.46) −0.02 (−0.3–0.28) 0.2 (−0.12–0.49)
Non-conﬂict parameters
Drift rate 0.77 (0.62–0.86) 0.48 (0.22–0.68) 0.38 (0.09–0.6) 0.04 (−0.32–0.36)
Non-decision time 0.73 (0.54–0.84) 0.57 (0.33–0.75) 0.38 (0.09–0.61) 0.5 (0.23–0.69)
Start shape 0.15(−0.14–0.42) 0.04 (−0.27–0.33) 0.19 (−0.14–0.47) −0.03 (−0.33–0.28)
Non-decision variability 0.61 (0.39–0.76) 0.41 (0.14–0.63) 0.18 (−0.17–0.47) 0.31 (−0.01–0.58)
Note. Conﬁdence intervals for Spearman’s rho were calculated using a bootstrap method (Revelle, 2018).
Fig. 5. Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between strategic adjustments in response caution in the Flanker and Stroop task. Session 1 (panel A) and
session 2 (panel B) shown separately (both N=43). Strategic adjustments in response caution are deﬁned as the change in boundary separation in
the diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks under speed emphasis relative to accuracy emphasis. The measurement units are the absolute diﬀerences in the
upper boundary parameter values.
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Scale (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Einarsson, & Einarsson, 2008).
The ﬂanker task appeared as described above. Participants performed 12 blocks of 144 trials in total. Twelve participants did not
complete all blocks within the allotted time, so data were only available for 11 (11 participants) or 10 (1 participant) blocks.
In the dot motion task, each frame consisted of 50 white dots (5x5 pixels in size) displayed within an oval patch (14.7 cm
high× 23.7 cm wide) in the centre of a grey screen (60 hz, 1680× 1050). On each frame, either 30% (high coherence) or 15% (low
coherence) of the dots were chosen as signal dots, which moved in a consistent direction (left or right) by 29 pixels. The lifetime of the
dots was 3 frames. Non-signal dots reappeared in a random position on each frame. The stimulus was displayed for a maximum of
2000ms, with a 500ms ISI. Participants were asked to determine the direction of the coherent motion. Each block consisted of 120
trials, 60 of each coherence level. Participants performed 12 blocks in total, except for 5 participants who completed 11 blocks, and 1
participant who completed 10.
Feedback relating to speed, accuracy or neutral blocks was given as described in Study 1. For the dot motion task, participants
were informed that their responses were too slow in speed blocks if their RT exceeded 700ms. Participants were informed that they
were too fast in all blocks if their responses were shorter than 250ms.
4.3. Data processing
The same inclusion criteria and RT cut-oﬀs described in study 1 were applied. After exclusions, 73 participants were retained for
the analysis of between-task correlations.
4.4. The drift-diﬀusion model
As the dot-motion task is not a conﬂict task, and the DMC extends the standard drift-diﬀusion model with conﬂict-speciﬁc
parameters, we opted to ﬁt the dot motion data with the standard drift-diﬀusion model (DDM; Ratcliﬀ, 1978; Ratcliﬀ & Rouder,
1998). Though the DMC is an extension of the DDM, it is possible that they capture variance associated with response caution in
slightly diﬀerent ways due to diﬀerent parameterisations. However, we are interested in the conclusions that researchers would draw
if they had used the model that was most appropriate for the task they had used. Critically for our purposes, strategic adjustments in
response caution are conceptually captured by a change in boundary separation in both models.
The primary diﬀerence between the DMC and the DDM is that, whereas accumulation rates in the DMC reﬂect a composite of
controlled and automatic processes, accumulation rates in the DDM are determined by a single drift rate parameter. This means that
the underlying accumulation rate in a given trial is constant over time, albeit subject to noise as in the DMC. Conditions with varying
diﬃculty are captured by diﬀerences in average drift rates (see Fig. 6).
4.5. Model ﬁtting
We ﬁt the DMC to the ﬂanker data using the same process described for study 1. For the DDM, we used the Diﬀusion Model
Analysis Toolbox (DMAT; Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008). Similar to our approach with the DMC, observed RT quantiles from
correct and incorrect are compared to data simulated from the model, and the deviance minimised using a Nelder-Mead simplex
(Nelder & Mead, 1965). As with the ﬂanker task, for simplicity we assumed that only boundary separation varied across instruction
condition. For each participant and task, we estimated eight parameters: boundary separation under speed emphasis, boundary
separation under standard instructions, boundary separation under accuracy emphasis, drift rate for high coherence trials, drift rate
for low coherence trials, mean non-decision time, starting point variability and non-decision variability. Between-trial variability in
Fig. 6. Schematic of the average underlying processing in the drift-diﬀusion model (DDM; Ratcliﬀ, 1978; Ratcliﬀ & Rouder, 1998). The blue and red
lines correspond to evidence accumulation rates to stimuli with more and less information respectively. Strategic changes in response caution are
captured by lowering the boundary when speed is emphasised. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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drift rates was ﬁxed to 0.1, starting point bias was ﬁxed to boundary separation/2, and within-trial noise was ﬁxed to 0.1. Note that
DMAT assumes uniform distributions for starting point and non-decision variability, whereas our implementation of the DMC uses a
beta and normal distribution respectively (following Ulrich et al., 2015).
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Descriptive statistics
5.1.1. Behavioural data
Reaction times and error rates for both tasks are shown in Fig. 7. As in Experiment 1, we veriﬁed that the average performance
reﬂected the expected manipulations by conducting separate repeated-measures ANOVAs on RTs and error rate in each task. In all
cases we observed signiﬁcant main eﬀects for both congruency/coherence and instruction (all p < .001; see Supplementary Material
C for full ANOVA results). Error rates and RTs increased for incongruent (ﬂanker) and low-coherence (dot-motion) stimuli relative to
congruent and high-coherence stimuli. Further, error rates increased and RTs decreased when participants were instructed to
prioritise speed over accuracy.
5.1.2. Model parameters
Descriptive statistics and graphical displays of the ﬁts for the best ﬁtting parameters can be seen in Supplementary material F. In
both tasks, as expected, boundary separation was decreased under speed relative to neutral and accuracy emphasis. Values for the
ﬂanker task are similar to those observed in Study 1. Values for the DDM parameters ﬁt to the dot-motion task were within typically
observed ranges (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011; Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009).
5.2. Between-task correlation of strategic adjustments of response caution
As in study 1, we observed a large correlation in strategic adjustments in response caution (rho=0.50, p < .001; Fig. 8). Thus,
behavioural variability captured by parameters representing response caution do share commonality across tasks from diﬀerent
cognitive domains. As in Study 1, this was numerically similar to the correlation observed in the adjustments in RT and accuracy in
isolation (both rho=0.40).
For correlations between self-report measures and strategic adjustments in response caution, see Supplementary material E.
Correlations with self-report were generally small and inconsistent across the tasks.
Fig. 7. Mean reaction times (top row) and accuracy (bottom row) for Flanker task (left panels) and dot-motion (right panels; N= 73 for both tasks).
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6. General discussion
The aim of the current work was to examine whether individual diﬀerences in strategic adjustments of response caution are a
reliable and generalisable dimension of response control. The answer to both questions is yes, though this is caveated by the mag-
nitude of the eﬀects that we observe. In Experiment 1, we observed moderate test-retest reliability in the change in response caution
in both the ﬂanker and Stroop tasks, as represented by the change in boundary separation between accuracy-emphasis and speed
emphasis instructions. It is not trivial that these strategic adjustments show non-zero reliability, though the magnitude is below the
levels typically considered good or excellent for conducting individual diﬀerences research (Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981;
Landis & Koch, 1977). The implication of this is that researchers interested in examining relationships between strategic adjustments
in response caution and personality or brain structure will likely require large sample sizes to detect relationships, if they exist.
With regards to generalisability, we show medium to large correlations in response caution adjustments across tasks conducted in
the same experimental session. We observed this between conﬂict tasks (study 1), and between a conﬂict and a perceptual decision
task (study 2). We focus our discussion on the interpretation of strategic control adjustments, and practical recommendations for
researchers interested in response caution.
6.1. Meaningful individual diﬀerences in default caution and its strategic adjustment
There is increasing evidence that there are meaningful individual diﬀerences in response caution (Evans et al., 2017; Forstmann
et al., 2010; Hedge et al., 2019; Karalunas et al., 2018; Pirrone et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2019; Ratcliﬀ et al., 2006a). Recently, we
applied the DMC to three response control datasets, comprising the ﬂanker and Simon tasks, ﬂanker and Stroop tasks, and two
variants of the Simon task. Our aim was to examine whether the model could uncover hidden correlations between mechanisms of
conﬂict processing that are obscured in traditional measures (Hedge, Powell, Bompas, et al., 2018). Though we observed no cor-
relation in the conﬂict parameters (amplitude and time-to-peak), we consistently observed correlations in boundary (see also Lerche
& Voss, 2017; Ratcliﬀ et al., 2015). This ﬁnding is mirrored in our results here, with boundary separation consistently showing
correlation between tasks. The novel contribution of this work is that we also see correlation in the strategic adjustment in response
caution, captured by the change in boundary separation between diﬀerent SAT instructions.
We manipulated participant’s levels of response caution through verbal instruction, which is the same method used by the
previous studies that have examined individual diﬀerences in response caution adjustments (Evans et al., 2017; Forstmann et al.,
2008, 2010). There are numerous alternative methods for eliciting a SAT (for a review, see Heitz, 2014). These include the use of
payoﬀ structures, in which participants receive diﬀerent rewards and penalisations based on accuracy and/or RT (e.g. Fitts, 1966;
Swensson & Edwards, 1971); and the use of response deadlines, where participants are informed that they must respond within
certain time limits (e.g. Pachella & Pew, 1968). Heitz notes that verbal instructions are popular because they are easily understood by
participants, and produce large eﬀects with relatively few trials. However, just as the interpretation of the common instruction in
choice RT tasks to be both fast and accurate is subjective, so too is the instruction to favour speed. Our reliabilities and correlations
suggest that participants interpret these instructions somewhat consistently, though we do not know what the basis is for the criteria
they set. In part, this is what we seek to understand by examining correlations with personality constructs such as impulsivity. To our
knowledge there has not been a systematic examination of the consequences of the choice of SAT manipulation for individual
Fig. 8. Between task correlation (Spearman’s rho) for strategic adjustments of control (boundary under accuracy emphasis – boundary under speed
emphasis) in the ﬂanker task and dot motion task. The measurement units are the absolute diﬀerences in the boundary separation parameter values.
Note that the data point on the far right came from unusually low and high ﬁtted boundary separation values under speed and accuracy emphasis
respectively, leading to an apparently large strategic adjustment. However, excluding this individual from our correlational analysis had little
impact on the observed eﬀect.
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diﬀerences relationships (though some have been compared experimentally, e.g. Dambacher & Hübner, 2013). It would beneﬁt future
research in this area to elucidate whether the method makes a diﬀerence.
6.2. Do strategic control adjustments go beyond boundary separation?
A wealth of literature exists for the speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ, spanning both behavioural and neurophysiological approaches (for a
review, see Heitz, 2014). In the context of the sequential sampling models, faster RTs and lower accuracy under speed emphasis are
primarily attributed to reduced boundary separation: a relative decrease in the amount of evidence required to initiate a response
(Ratcliﬀ et al., 2016). However, performance under speed emphasis has also been captured by additional reductions in non-decision
time, as well as sometimes lower drift rates (Rae et al., 2014; Starns, Ratcliﬀ, & McKoon, 2012; Zhang & Rowe, 2014). Further, it has
been argued that strategic adjustments can be captured by time-varying decision processes, such as urgency signals or collapsing
boundaries (Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr, 2009; Ditterich, 2006a, 2006b; Drugowitsch, Moreno-Bote, Churchland, Shadlen, & Pouget,
2012; though see Hawkins, Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Ratcliﬀ, & Brown, 2015). Here, we ﬁt a relatively simple model that only
allowed boundary separation to vary across instruction conditions. Therefore it is possible that our ﬁts absorbed variance in beha-
viour that might be captured by other parameters in a more complex model. Note that in the introduction, we highlighted the
diﬃculty in translating assumptions from within-subject contexts to the study of individual diﬀerences. The SAT paradigm is also an
approach that has largely been developed in within-subject experimental contexts, and the average best ﬁtting model may not be
appropriate for every individual. For example, we could ask whether every individual shows a decrease in boundary, non-decision
time, and/or information processing parameters (c.f. Haaf & Rouder, 2018). Our results here provide a starting point for further
examination; that we observe some reliability and cross-task correlation in response caution here suggests that there is reliable
variance in the behaviour to be captured.
6.3. Previous literature on the reliability of response caution
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to examine the reliability of parameters of the diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks. Previous work
has examined the test-retest reliability of the standard drift-diﬀusion model (Lerche & Voss, 2017; Schubert et al., 2016), including
applications to conﬂict tasks (Enkavi et al., 2019), though not in a SAT paradigm. Nevertheless, we can contrast our estimates of the
reliability of boundary separation under standard instructions with theirs.
Lerche and Voss (2017) reported one week reliability for a lexical decision task, a recognition memory task, and an associative
priming task. They observed correlations of approximately r=0.8 for boundary separation in all tasks (see maximum likelihood
estimates in their Fig. 2). Schubert et al. (2016) report eight month reliabilities for three tasks, including a two- and four-choice
variant of a visual choice RT task, a Sternberg memory scanning task, and a Posner letter matching task. Correlations for boundary
separation between sessions ranged from r=0.2 to r=0.6 (see their Table A2). Recently, Enkavi et al. (2019) applied the hier-
archical drift diﬀusion model (Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013) to reliability data from 15 choice RT tasks, including a three choice
Stroop task. The average time between sessions was approximately 16 weeks. The reliability of boundary separation in the Stroop task
was 0.29, which was slightly below the median reliability for all the tasks (0.31; see their HDDM values in Fig. 5). Taking these
previous studies together, our results fall within the range of reliabilities previously observed, but the range is broad. It would be
premature to suggest that there are systematic diﬀerences between tasks in the consistency of response caution that they elicit,
though we note that it was relatively low for the Stroop task in both our Study 1 and in Enkavi et al. (2019) data.
6.4. Model choice and model complexity
To examine the reliability of strategic adjustments in response caution, we applied the drift-diﬀusion model (Ratcliﬀ, 1978), and
an extended diﬀusion model for conﬂict tasks (Ulrich et al., 2015). Though the drift diﬀusion model is widely applied in SAT studies
(e.g. Mulder et al., 2010; Ratcliﬀ, 1985; Zhang & Rowe, 2014), there are alternative models for both conﬂict (Hubner, Steinhauser, &
Lehle, 2010; White, Ratcliﬀ, & Starns, 2011) and non-conﬂict tasks (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Several
empirical and theoretical reviews have considered the relationship between diﬀerent models, and it has been noted that there is often
a high degree of mimicry between them, such that researchers would often reach the same conclusion irrespective of the model
chosen (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Donkin et al., 2011; Ratcliﬀ & Smith, 2004; White, Servant, & Logan,
2017). Nevertheless, we brieﬂy consider the potential impact of this choice.
Both Forstmann et al. (2010) and Evans et al. (2017) examined individual diﬀerences in response caution adjustments using the
Linear Ballistic Accumulator model (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Whereas in the DDM a single drift process represents the diﬀerence
in evidence between to alternatives, the LBA consists of separate accumulators for each response alternative and a single threshold.
Starting points for the accumulators in the LBA are drawn from a uniform distribution, and response caution is captured by the
diﬀerence between the edge of the start point distribution and the height of the threshold. Forstmann et al. (2010) noted that
applying the drift-diﬀusion model to their data did not produce the correlation between white matter strength and caution adjust-
ments seen with the LBA (see their Supplementary Online Material). They suggested that this may be because the diﬀusion model
captured the SAT manipulation in both non-decision time and drift rates, in addition to boundary separation. An imperfect mapping
between the response caution parameters has also been noted when ﬁtting one model to data generated from the other (Donkin et al.,
2011). Given this discrepancy, researchers may wish to check the robustness of conclusions drawn from one model to another.
Though we made the simplistic assumption that the SAT manipulation was speciﬁcally captured by changes in boundary
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separation in our ﬁts, we added complexity by including parameters representing inter-trial variability in non-decision time and the
starting point of the accumulation process. Including these variability parameters often produces better ﬁts to empirical data at the
sample average level (Ratcliﬀ & Tuerlinckx, 2002), but they may also lead to poorer recovery of individual diﬀerences in the main
parameters of interest, particularly with fewer trial numbers (Lerche & Voss, 2016; van Ravenzwaaij, Donkin, & Vandekerckhove,
2017). We reran some of our analyses without including the variability parameters, and it produced almost identical estimates for the
reliability of strategic adjustments (see Supplementary Material G). This may be in part because we had a large number of trials, and a
model that was quite well constrained across multiple conditions. Where researchers have smaller trial numbers, they may wish to
implement a simpler model, or check that their conclusions are not speciﬁc to a particular parameter choice.
6.5. Strategic adjustments and personality traits
Willingness or reluctance to commit errors while attempting speeded responses has been linked to the concept of impulsivity
(Kagan, 1966), and recently correlated with need for closure (Evans et al., 2017) and brain structure (Forstmann et al., 2010).
However, we see little evidence for a correlation with any self-report impulsivity dimension in our data (Supplementary Material E;
see also Dickman & Meyer, 1988). We also tested correlations with self-report compliance and the big ﬁve personality traits (neu-
roticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness; Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 2004; McCrae & John, 1992).
There were no consistent relationships.
The absence of a correlation with impulsivity measures is particularly notable here, given the conceptual overlap between im-
pulsivity and a lowered boundary. For example, Metin et al. (2013) examined whether diﬀerences in RT and accuracy in children
with attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder relative to healthy controls were best captured by “ineﬃcient” or “impulsive” in-
formation processing in the context of the drift diﬀusion model. These corresponded to drift rate and boundary separation respec-
tively. Despite the common terminology, our ﬁndings mirror a trend in the impulsivity literature to observe little to no correlation
between behavioural and self-report measures (Sharma et al., 2014). It remains a possibility that there are non-zero correlations that
we did not have suﬃcient power to detect. As we discuss in the next section, given that the reliability of strategic adjustments is
suboptimal, we should expect correlations with other variables to be small.
6.6. Practical considerations for future research
The consistent between-task correlation in strategic adjustment indicates that the extent to which an individual adjusts their
behaviour is not entirely task or domain speciﬁc. A practical consideration for researchers interested in response caution and its
strategic adjustments, and are not speciﬁcally interested in a particular cognitive domain (e.g. response conﬂict) is that ﬁtting the
DMC to our response conﬂict tasks was substantially more demanding on time and/or computational resources than ﬁtting the DDM
to a perceptual decision making task. Note that this is not speciﬁc to the DMC (White et al., 2017), but rather reﬂects more complex
models that do not have analytical solutions that allow faster estimation. Until faster methods can be realised (e.g. Mestdagh,
Verdonck, Meers, Loossens, & Tuerlinckx, 2018), it may be more tractable to use non-conﬂict tasks to which the DDM or linear
ballistic accumulator (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) can be applied.
The reliabilities of strategic adjustments of response caution that we observe fall in the range typically interpreted as “moderate”
(Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). We have recently discussed how reliabilities in this region are
potentially problematic for examining individual diﬀerences in cognitive tasks (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). The ICC reﬂects the
relative contribution of between-subject variance (individual diﬀerences) and measurement error to variance in the variable of
interest. In order to examine whether adjustments in response caution are related to trait measures (e.g. personality), we desire
variance in our behavioural measure to also reﬂect individual diﬀerences that are stable over time. When measures are noisy,
correlations with external variables will be weaker and require larger samples to detect.
To put the ICCs we observe in context, they are similar to or exceed those we observed for several commonly used measures of
response control and processing (e.g. ﬂanker RT cost: 0.50, stop-signal reaction time: 0.43, Navon global precedence: 0; Hedge,
Powell, & Sumner, 2018). Notably in the case of those traditional measures, we did not observe correlation between tasks in our
previous study, despite it being commonly assumed that they share common mechanisms (see also Rey-Mermet, Gade, & Oberauer,
2017). Here, with strategic adjustments of response caution, we do consistently observe a correlation between tasks. Nevertheless,
poor reliability corresponds to a reduced ability to detect correlation using those measures that must be compensated for (e.g. by
increasing statistical power).
It is possible that future work would beneﬁt from developments in model-based analyses, by integrating individual diﬀerences
measures of interest in to the parameter estimation (Evans et al., 2017; Turner et al., 2013; Wiecki et al., 2013). Here, we ﬁt the
models to each task and individual independently. In contrast, hierarchical models describe both the sample and individual si-
multaneously, as well as allow for regressors to be used to inform parameter estimation. For example, Evans et al. (2017) compared
three diﬀerent models when examining the relationship between response caution and need for closure. They ﬁrst ﬁt a hierarchical
linear ballistic accumulator model in which parameters were determined by the behavioural data alone. The second model did not
allow for individual diﬀerences in response caution, assigning everyone the same value, though diﬀering between speed- and ac-
curacy-emphasis. In the third model, rather than estimating response caution from the behavioural data, it was determined by a
function that linked the parameter values to participants’ questionnaire values. Unsurprisingly, the ﬁrst (unconstrained) model
provided the best ﬁt to the data. However, the third model outperformed the second, suggesting that there are common individual
diﬀerences in the personality questionnaire and behavioural responses. In a second experiment by Evans et al. this improvement
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when comparing models contrasted against non-signiﬁcant correlations between parameter estimates (and RTs) ﬁt independently and
subsequently correlated with the questionnaire values. Such joint modelling techniques may provide more powerful tests where
appropriate.
6.7. Conclusions
The extent to which an individual prioritises accuracy or speed in choice RT tasks is commonly discussed but has less often been
the focus of interest than individual diﬀerences in cognitive abilities. Here, we provide evidence that questions about individual
diﬀerences in caution and its strategic adjustment are at least somewhat viable. On a given occasion, individuals show consistency in
the extent to which they strategically adjust their levels of response caution across diﬀerent tasks. Across time points, individuals
show non-zero, but sub-optimal, levels of reliability in strategic adjustments. Though these levels of reliability raise power concerns
for future research, we believe that our results and previous literature are evidence that there is value in pursuing such questions.
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